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3.1  Introduction 
Most Americans assume that new technological innovations will revolution- 
ize both  the economy and society; they fervently believe that new products 
and processes will automatically enhance jobs, increase productivity, and make 
American corporations more competitive in global markets. Yet in order for a 
new technology to have revolutionary impact, it has to be linked with existing 
business practices. Managers and engineers often struggle to develop an appro- 
priate business organization for manufacturing and marketing a new technol- 
ogy. Significantly, without an effective business organization, a new technol- 
ogy may not be used and may instead lie dormant for years. 
Despite the importance of  linking technology with business organizations, 
we know surprisingly little about how businessmen build business organiza- 
tions. Few economists or historians have investigated how businessmen con- 
vert firms from the entrepreneurial startup characterized by one or two charis- 
matic individuals to a more formal or elaborate organization where managers 
coordinate key activities.' During this crucial transition, the first generation of 
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1. In historiographic terms, the unexplored territory lies between the entrepreneurial firm  of 
Joseph Schumpeter (1934) and the managerial firm of Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.  (1977). However, 
one should note that not all firms shift from the entrepreneurial to the managerial hierarchy empha- 
sized by Chandler. Other firms acquire more formal structures without hierarchy or  managers; for 
instance, as John K. Brown (1992) has shown in the case of the Baldwin Locomotive Works, many 
of the functions we associate with managers were handled by  a group of partners who owned the 
Baldwin Works. 
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managers define the boundaries of the firm, selecting which activities the firm 
will undertake and which will be performed outside by suppliers, customers, 
or other intermediaries. Within the firm, the pioneering managers have to deter- 
mine who will perform the key tasks and who will make decisions about differ- 
ent areas such as marketing, production, or research. Equally important, it is 
during the shift from the entrepreneurial to managerial stage that the firm de- 
fines its corporate culture, modes of internal communications,  and ways  of 
resolving differences between groups or departments. And finally, for the his- 
tory of a particular technology, this transitional period is significant because it 
is then that inventors and their business associates often make a series of inter- 
related  decisions about manufacturing  and  marketing an  invention; because 
production  and  selling require  substantial investments  of capital, personnel, 
and resources, it is in this transition that the character of a technology and its 
impact on society are defined (David 1985).’ 
To understand  how firms move from the entrepreneurial to the managerial 
stage, this paper investigates the rise of the Thomson-Houston Electric Com- 
pany in the 1880s. Created by Charles A. Coffin and Elihu Thomson, this firm 
evolved an internal organization that allowed it to exploit successfully the new 
technology of electric lighting. Combining Coffin’s vision of selling equipment 
to newly forming central-station utilities with Thomson’s creation of new sys- 
tems  for  generating  and  distributing  electric  light  and  power,  Thomson- 
Houston played a major role in defining the electrical technology used in the 
United States during the past century. Thomson-Houston quickly came to dom- 
inate the electrical manufacturing industry, and in  1892, it absorbed the rival 
Edison General Electric Company to become the General Electric C~mpany.~ 
In studying Thomson-Houston  and GE, I  have found that the intellectual 
challenge has been not so much understanding the technology as developing 
ways of thinking about the evolution of the business organization. The central 
question is to understand  how Thomson, Coffin, and other members of  this 
firm coordinated the key activities of  marketing, manufacturing, and product 
innovation.  To  a certain extent, one can analyze their organization-building 
efforts in terms of rational actors who used economic or functionalist criteria 
to guide their choices. One can use Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.’s (1962, 1977) no- 
tions of strategy and structure to describe the evolution of Thomson-Houston, 
but I have been troubled that these concepts do not explain the dynamics of 
individuals and groups within the organization. In particular, the Chandlerian 
paradigm does not help explain why Thomson-Houston struggled to create an 
effective organizational arrangement for product innovation. In order to fill this 
2. Frequently, historians of technology have treated this transition by focusing on what they call 
the development phase of technological change, a phase that they see as coming between invention 
or conceptualization  and innovation or designing for manufacture and  marketing. See Hughes 
1976 and Staudenmaier 1985. 
3. For a complete history of the Thomson-Houston Electric Company and how it became Gen- 
eral Electric, see Carlson 1991. 57  Coordination of Business Organization and Technological Innovation 
gap between theory and data, I will introduce in this paper a model of the 
business firm as a coalition of interest groups and use this model not only to 
describe Thomson-Houston but to narrate the development of a specific prod- 
uct, an alternating-current system for incandescent lighting in the 1880s. 
With these goals in mind, this paper begins with a section that briefly out- 
lines the rational-actor approach and my model of the firm. Section 3.3 intro- 
duces  the  Thomson-Houston  Electric  Company  and  describes  the  interest 
groups within that organization. Section 3.4 narrates how the company devel- 
oped its AC lighting system and reveals the problems that the managers and 
inventors encountered as they tried to coordinate business organization with 
technological innovation. In the conclusion, I discuss how the model allows us 
to sort out this complex historical case and enhances our understanding of the 
coordination  of functions within the business firm. Thus, this paper should 
help link economic and historical studies of American business enterprise. 
3.2  The Business Firm: Economically Rational Actors or Politically 
Motivated Interest Groups? 
Over the past fifty years, economists have frequently considered business 
firms to be “atoms,” or irreducible units of analysis. In taking this approach, 
they have created powerful and insightful models of how markets and indus- 
tries  behave, and they have been  able to frame macroeconomic policy  for 
American society (Temin 1991, 1-2). 
Nevertheless, the view that individual firms are indivisible atoms works best 
when one is studying an industry or market in which numerous small firms are 
competing. It is an entirely different matter when one considers the more typi- 
cal situation in American business history, an oligopolistic industry dominated 
by  several  large  firms  possessing  complex  internal  structures  (Galambos 
1991). Made up of  numerous groups and individuals, large business enterprises 
do not necessarily make decisions simply using the economics of  supply and 
demand, but often make choices in response to a variety of internal and exter- 
nal pressures (Cyert and March  1963). Moreover, even a cursory comparison 
of American and Japanese firms reveals that businessmen using the same tech- 
nology may organize their firms in substantially different ways, and this sug- 
gests that we need to know much more about how and why companies acquire 
their internal organization (McCraw  1986). Consequently, if  economists and 
policymakers are going to develop more sophisticated models of markets and 
industries, then the next step is to move away from treating the firm as a black 
box and to look more closely at how firms evolve and acquire their internal 
structures. 
To look inside the firm, one can turn to two extensive bodies of 1iteratu1-e.~ 
4. The discussion in the next few paragraphs has been shaped by a reading of major treatises in 
economic and organizational theory and critical overviews of these two fields. As a historian look- 58  W.  Bernard Carlson 
One can follow the lead of economists and business historians who often view 
the firm in terms of  rational actors using  economic or functional criteria to 
make choices. Alternatively, one can use the ideas of organizational theorists 
to interpret the inner workings of  the firm in terms of political give-and-take 
among groups. Because these perspectives will be compared and contrasted in 
this  paper,  let me discuss what each contributes  to investigating  how  firms 
select and coordinate functions in the transition from the entrepreneurial to the 
managerial stage. 
The rational-actor approach begins with the assumptions that managers at- 
tempt to make reasonable decisions on the basis of the knowledge they have at 
hand and that they make decisions to direct their organizations toward specific 
goals. As Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (1962,  1977, 1990) has argued, managers 
often articulate goals in form of a strategy that they then use to shape the struc- 
ture of the organization. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as 
managers took up new high-speed, energy-intensive industrial  processes and 
pursued national and then international markets, the linking of  strategy  and 
structure required them to select carefully which activities or functions should 
be brought inside the firm. In coordinating a select group of activities, manag- 
ers reduced  uncertainty  and improved  efficiency  and profitability. To  select 
which functions to integrate and coordinate, managers presumably used some 
economic criteria such as transaction costs. As  shown by  Ronald  H. Coase 
(1937) and Oliver Williamson  (19854 a transaction-cost analysis consists of 
determining what it would cost the firm to contract with an outside agent to 
perform a task and then comparing that with what  it would cost to perform 
the same activity internally. As Chandler (1990) has demonstrated, managers 
frequently  lowered  internal costs by  exploiting the economies  of  scale and 
scope available through new production technologies, improvements in organi- 
zation, and the opening of new markets. Acting in a rational manner, managers 
presumably  brought into the firm those tasks that could be performed more 
cheaply and efficiently inside the organization. 
Although I agree with Chandler’s maxim that structure follows strategy, this 
maxim does not tell us much about the processes by which historical actors 
created and linked strategic goals with an effective organizational structure. 
How did the pioneering businessmen in a particular industry identify and de- 
velop an effective strategy? How did they choose which functions to empha- 
size and which to subordinate in their organizations? How did the first genera- 
tion of managers draw on existing social structures to fashion new corporate 
hierarchies? And how effective were these new hierarchies? From their incep- 
tion,  did  these  organizations  allocate  resources  and  coordinate  tasks  effi- 
~~ 
ing into these two literatures, I  recommend to other outsiders that they begin with the overviews 
provided by  the following works: Davidson and Lytle 1982, 320-55;  Allison 1971; and Pfeffer 
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ciently? Or in some cases, did early managers make mistakes in trying to link 
strategy and structure (Galambos 1979)? I would suggest that, while structure 
does follow strategy, the processes by  which these were joined are not auto- 
matic but rather complex and contingent. Indeed, what is needed is a histori- 
cally based model of how actors create and link business strategy and structure. 
As a first step toward such a model, I find it is useful to think of the firm as 
a collection of interest groups, each with its own mind-set. Within a firm there 
are different aggregates of  individuals promoting their own interests and, at 
times,  seeking to control the organization. Each of  these aggregates may be 
called an interest group, and they may be differentiated by their leaders, func- 
tions, or, most important, business-technological mind-sets. Each group may 
articulate ideas about how new technology should be used to capture particular 
markets or perform certain production steps and hence ensure the growth and 
prosperity of the firm. The central point here is that groups within the firm may 
possess very different ideas about how the firm should operate. For the firm to 
make a decision about technological innovation, marketing programs, or any- 
thing else, several of the interest groups must negotiate and compromise por- 
tions of their mind-sets and then direct other groups to implement the plan on 
which they agree. When the resources and rewards  available to different in- 
trafirm groups are ample, they often find it easy to negotiate and implement 
decisions. Similarly, groups work well together when they feel that their posi- 
tions within the firm are respected by  the other groups. Conversely, should a 
group perceive that its position in the organization is being challenged or that 
it may lose access to resources and rewards, then cooperation may give way to 
conflict and disorder. 
This model of the firm is drawn from several sources. First, it is based on the 
social construction of technology approach of Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker 
( 1987).’ These two sociologists have suggested that technological artifacts are 
defined and shaped through the interaction of social groups. Although  I  am 
impressed with Bijker and Pinch’s model, I am troubled that it fails to locate 
social groups in a larger framework of relationships. Without  understanding 
the positions of  the groups relative to each other, it is difficult to comprehend 
how they will use and shape technology. 
To  offset this problem, one can turn to organizational theory. Within this 
intellectual tradition, scholars concentrate less on individual leaders and ratio- 
nal decision making and more on groups within the organization. The choices 
and activities of the organization  are the result of  the behavior  of  different 
internal groups. Within this field, there has been much debate on how groups 
interact. Some investigators have argued for a garbage-can model in which the 
interaction of  groups is anarchical, and that choices made within an organiza- 
tion are based on the random confluence of needs and resources (March and 
5. In analyzing how groups shape technology, sociologists of technology have also created a 
network approach. For example, see Law and Callon 1992. 60  W. Bernard Carlson 
Olsen 1976). Other theorists have posited a bureaucratic model in which each 
group within an organization has a task or mission to perform, and each group 
does whatever is related to or justified by its mission (Allison 1971). And still 
other scholars have proposed political or power models that reveal how groups 
may engage in political give-and-take wherein they compete for resources, bar- 
gain with each other, and create coalitions. Within power and political models, 
the choices of the organization are the result of intraorganization groups com- 
ing to agree or disagree with one another (Pfeffer 1981, 1992). 
For the purposes of understanding the evolution of business firms, the politi- 
cal model of Samuel B. Bacharach and Edward J. Lawler (1980) seems espe- 
cially appropriate. They emphasize that interest groups and coalitions are the 
basic units of  analysis. Organizations make choices as a result of  different 
internal groups bargaining with each other and creating alliances or coalitions. 
Once coalitions are created, the allied groups then select tactics to achieve their 
shared objectives. For instance, in his study of the founding of  the General 
Electric Research Laboratory, George Wise (1980) demonstrated that the labo- 
ratory flourished because its first directors succeeded in integrating the profes- 
sional aspirations of research scientists with the commercial needs of the com- 
pany.  Like Wise, I  shall suggest that progress occurs in the firm  when the 
leaders of  groups strive for cooperation rather than overtly challenge each 
other. 
Whereas Bacharach and Lawler’s model implies that each group has a partic- 
ular viewpoint, Bacharach and Lawler say little about how and why each group 
chooses to articulate different goals, needs, and perceptions. Consequently, a 
third idea informing this model of the firm is Reese V. Jenkins’s (1975) concept 
of the business-technological mind-set. In his study of the photographic indus- 
try, Jenkins observed that major changes took place in the industry when entre- 
preneurs succeeded in matching new  technology with new  marketing tech- 
niques, thus creating what he called a business-technological mind-set. For 
Jenkins, a mind-set was a set of ideas and perceptions businessmen had of the 
market and of the potential of different technological options. Guided by their 
mind-sets, various entrepreneurs were able to create effective organizations 
and dominate the industry at different times. 
One should note that while Jenkins attributed different mind-sets to individ- 
ual firms within the photographic industry, in this paper I shall be arguing that 
different groups within the firm  may possess different business-technological 
mind-sets.  Several historians  have  investigated how  different  leaders and 
groups within a firm may  articulate and act on different visions of  what the 
company should do to grow and be profitable (Leslie 1979; Carlson 1992). 
The business-technology mind-set is an important ingredient in the model 
proposed here, providing an element of purposeful behavior in an otherwise 
deterministic model. Without developing a way of talking about the values and 
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als are simply the pawns of larger political or economic forces that they cannot 
change. As I will show below, individuals within Thomson-Houston developed 
their own distinctive mind-sets about their work, their roles in the company, 
and the strategy of  the company. In turn, individuals used their mind-sets to 
build groups, perform their key tasks, and move the firm in the direction of 
their mind-set. In this sense, I am trying to make room for individual choice in 
the face of  economic and organizational theories that previously have  been 
uncertain about how to include the individual. 
3.3  The Strategy and Structure of Thomson-Houston 
The interest-group model is useful because it permits us to trace how entre- 
preneurs and inventors in the Thomson-Houston Electric Company struggled 
to link business organization and technological innovation. This company was 
created in 1882 by a group of shoe manufacturers in Lynn, Massachusetts, to 
exploit the inventions of  Elihu Thomson and Edwin J. Houston. Beginning 
in 1878, these two men developed an arc-lighting system. Unlike the Edison 
incandescent  lighting  system  which  powered  hundreds  of  small,  sixteen- 
candlepower incandescent lights, the Thomson-Houston system featured fifty 
to sixty large (2,500 candlepower) lights. Because of these technical character- 
istics, the Thomson-Houston system was used for lighting factories, depart- 
ment stores, and streets (Carlson 1991, 193-200). 
Along  with  other early electrical manufacturers in  the early  1880s, the 
Thomson-Houston Electric Company quickly realized that the challenge in 
electric lighting was to improve the technology while devising new marketing 
techniques. Initially, electrical manufacturers tried to sell lighting systems out- 
right to customers, but there was a limited market for free-standing, isolated 
stations. There were few industrial or large retail concerns that had both the 
need for artificial illumination and the capital required to purchase a steam 
engine, dynamo, and lights. (Even the first lighting systems with four to six 
arc lights cost between $3,000 and $5,000.) Instead, it soon became clear that 
electric-lighting equipment required a new marketing arrangement. What was 
needed was a strategy that reduced the cost of lighting to each consumer by 
spreading the capital costs of the steam engine, generator, and distribution net- 
work across a large customer base. The marketing arrangement that answered 
these requirements was the central-station utility. Although pioneered by local 
businessmen in San Francisco in 1879, this strategy was promoted by Thomas 
Edison, who built a central station for incandescent lighting at Pearl Street in 
New York in 1882 (Carlson 1991, 173-75). 
Although Edison is remembered in the history books for his Pearl Street 
station, the individual responsible for the perfection of the central-station strat- 
egy was the vice president of Thomson-Houston, Charles A. Coffin. A shoe 
manufacturer, Coffin built a successful firm in Lynn in the 1870s by  taking 62  W. Bernard Carlson 
advantage of new shoemaking machinery and by  aggressively developing his 
marketing organization.h In  1882, he helped organize the Thomson-Houston 
Electric Company and focused his efforts on the problems of  marketing the 
new technology of  electric lighting. Rather than  sell equipment for isolated 
plants, Coffin had Thomson-Houston  concentrate on promoting  central sta- 
tions. Coffin perceived that the central-station strategy would permit the devel- 
opment of  a substantial market for electric lighting. By offering an extensive 
product line of different-sized dynamos, the firm could provide the equipment 
needed to supply electric lighting to nearly every town and city. Furthermore, 
by selling both  arc and incandescent lighting systems, it was possible to en- 
courage utilities to add machines to expand their business to include lighting 
for streets, shops, and homes. From the standpoint of the manufacturer of elec- 
trical equipment, central stations were ideal customers in that they provided a 
ready demand for the product that was free of the risky business of convincing 
consumers to install lights in their businesses and homes. In that sense, the 
central-station strategy was similar to the manner in which Henry Ford exter- 
nalized the risk of  marketing his Model T by  developing  a network of fran- 
chised dealers who were required to purchase a certain quota of cars (Chandler 
1977,359,457). 
In order to implement the central-station marketing strategy, Coffin and his 
associates organized Thomson-Houston along functional lines (fig. 3.1 ). Just 
as American railroad  companies in the  1850s had organized departments to 
carry out the tasks of operating trains, repairing rolling stock, and maintaining 
the  roadbed,  Thomson-Houston  had  groups  that  handled  the  key  jobs  of 
designing,  manufacturing,  marketing,  and  financing  electrical  equipment 
(Chandler 1977, 8 1-12  1). Significantly, the firm organized these activities be- 
cause they were the functions that had to be performed in order to sell electrical 
equipment for use in central stations. Had Coffin, Thomson, and other manag- 
ers conceptualized either their marketing strategy or their technology in other 
ways-for  instance, had they chosen to build and sell isolated systems-then 
they would have created a different business organization. 
At  Thomson-Houston,  three  interest  groups  appeared  in  response  to the 
central-station strategy. Each performed a key function, and each was headed 
by a strong individual who ensured that the function was performed properly. 
While Coffin handled marketing and finance at the Boston headquarters, Ed- 
win Wilbur Rice, Jr., supervised manufacturing and engineering at the Lynn 
plant, and Thomson concentrated on invention and design in his Model Room. 
As each of these men pursued his function, each developed a mind-set that 
reflected his role in the firm and how he thought the firm should operate. Be- 
cause the interaction  of  those  mind-sets  influenced  how  Thomson-Houston 
pursued product innovation, let us examine each group and its mind-set. 
6.  For  biographical details on Charles A. Coffin, see his obituary in  Lynn Historical So&@ 
Regisrer 26, pt.  1: 32-33  (1934); and Wilson 1946. (Lynn Syndicate) 
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Fig. 3.1  Organization of Thomson-Houston Electric Company, 1883-92 
Sources: Annual reports of Thomson-Houston Electric Company, 1888-91;  various 
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3.3.1  Selling Dynamics: Coffin and the Marketing Group 
The central-station strategy led Coffin to establish a distinctive group around 
the functions of marketing and finance. This group was centered in the com- 
pany’s  Boston office and thus physically and intellectually separate from the 
groups located at the Lynn factory. Coffin himself worked in this office, aided 
by four or five sales managers. Each manager was assigned to a product area, 
such as arc lighting, incandescent lighting, or street railways, and each man- 
ager worked with the Lynn factory to coordinate production with sales. Given 
that the  company sold each product as a separate system, it made  sense to 
have a manager for each; notably, this  was quite different from the  Edison 
organization, which at that time had seven sales managers at its headquarters, 
each of  whom was assigned a selling territory  in the United States. To  assist 
Coffin and the sales managers, the Boston office also had a staff of bookkeep- 
ers and clerks who handled the details of advertising, sales transactions, and 
bond and stock issues.’ 
Beyond the Boston headquarters, Coffin established district sales offices in 
major cities. Each district office promoted Thomson-Houston products in the 
city and the surrounding region and handled the local details of each sale and 
installation. Because the district offices permitted the company to reach into 
new territory, Coffin carefully selected his district managers; for example, Cof- 
fin had Silas Barton move from being general manager to being the manager 
of the first district office in Chicago in 1885.* 
Finally, below the managers in the Boston headquarters and the district of- 
fices were the salesmen, or “drummers.” Traveling to towns and cities, they 
were the men who sold electric-lighting equipment to the organizers and oper- 
ators of the new utility companies. In addition to selling equipment, salesmen 
were trained to help secure local capital, obtain the necessary  franchise from 
the municipal government, and organize the operating company. Following the 
salesmen, an “expert,” or construction engineer, was sent from the Lynn factory 
to install the electrical machinery. With this sales staff in place, the number of 
central stations using Thomson-Houston arc lights grew rapidly; whereas there 
were 3  1 companies using their equipment in July  1884, two years later there 
were 100 (table 3.1).9 
7.  “Methods  of  C. A.  Coffin in  Building a Commercial  Organization:  Story Told  by  J. R. 
McKee,” 20 April  1927; “Recollections of C. B. Davis, J. P.  Felton, and C. B. Burleigh, All of 
Boston Office,”  29 May  to  1 June 1925; both in John W.  Hammond File, 5757-8 and 5194-8, 
General Electric Company, Schenectady, New York; Passer 1952, especially 382. 
8. By 1890, Thomson-Houston had district offices in Chicago, New York, Atlanta, Washington, 
San Francisco, Kansas City, Saint Paul, Cincinnati, and Philadelphia; see “The Thomson-Houston 
Electric Company,” [general catalog],  1 December  1890, Lynn Historical Society, Lynn, Massa- 
chusetts. See also A. L. Rohrer to J. A. McManus, 4 July 1945, Thomas Collection, General Elec- 
tric Hall of History, Schenectady, New York (hereafter cited as Hall of History Collection); and 
“Further Recollection of T.  A. McLoughlin . . .  District Office Organization;’ 18 June 1925, Ham- 
mond File, L1028-9. 
9. For information on how Coffin organized the sales staff, see “Further recollection of T. A. 
McLoughlin . .  .  District Office Organization,” 18 June 1925, Hammond File, 1.1028-9. The num- 65  Coordination of Business Organization and Technological Innovation 
One of the most serious problems faced by many fledgling utility companies 
was raising sufficient capital to pay for equipment. According to one estimate, 
utilities in the 1880s had to invest between $4 and $8 in plant and equipment 
for each dollar of sales (Mitchell 1960, 45). Consequently, in building up his 
sales organization, Coffin was obliged to look for ways to help central stations 
finance their purchases. As one solution, Coffin had Thomson-Houston accept 
bonds as partial paylnent from utilities. Coffin then converted the local utility 
bonds into capital by organizing a series of trust funds that sold bonds repre- 
senting local utility secunties to  I’homson-Houston stockholders.  Using this 
financial innovation, Coffin prevented utility securities (some of  which were 
of little value) from accumulating in the company’s treasury, while at the same 
time generating $2.6 million in capital.I0 
Coffin used the income from the trust series and surplus profits to strengthen 
the firm. First, he plowed these funds back into the firm and enlarged the Lynn 
factory. As will be discussed later, the factory grew rapidly, with a new build- 
ing added each year between 1884 and 189  1. Second, Coffin used these funds 
to buy  up  smaller rival firms. Between  1888 and  1891, Thomson-Houston 
spent approximately $4 million to acquire eight electrical companies. Several 
of these companies, including Brush Electric, Fort Wayne, Schuyler, Excelsior, 
and Indianapolis Jenney, were competitors in arc lighting; others, such as Van 
Depoele Electric Manufacturing  and Bentley-Knight Electric Railway, were 
purchased for their street-railway and motor patents. Several of the arc-lighting 
firms had encountered various problems in manufacturing and marketing their 
systems, but Coffin hastened their decline by having Thomson-Houston law- 
yers vigorously prosecute them for infringement of Thomson’s patent for a dy- 
namo regulator. It does not appear that Coffin undertook the merger campaign 
to  acquire  additional  production  capacity, because  most  of  the  purchased 
factories  were  closed.  Instead,  Coffin  eliminated  these  rivals  to  increase 
Thomson-Houston’s market share and secure control of key patents. Still an- 
other important benefit of  the merger campaign was that it brought several 
inventors into the Thomson-Houston organization, and they were soon design- 
ing products and filing for patents for the company (Passer 1953, 52-56). 
As Thomson-Houston was successful in selling arc lighting to central sta- 
tions, Coffin had the company move into new product areas (table 3.1). With 
ber of  arc stations installed is from “Exhibit. The Following List of Thomson-Houston Plants 
. , . ,” circa 1888, Notebooks, Elihu Thomson Papers, American Philosophical Society, Philadel- 
phia (hereafter cited as TP). Hereafter, this pamphlet is cited as “List of T-H Plants.” 
10. Coffin appears to have structured each trust fund so as to include bonds from both high- and 
low-performing utilities. In this way, each trust fund probably paid a return to its investors, since 
the higher value of  the bonds of the profitable utilities offset the unprofitable utilities.  In this 
situation, the trust series served not so much to transfer risk from Thomson-Houston to the stock- 
holder, as to function as another instrument for raising capital. See M. F.  Westover, “History of the 
T-H Trusts, Series A, B, C and D,” January 1916, Hammond File, 5767; Passer, 1953,29;  Hughes 
1983,395. Table 3.1  Spread of Thomson-Houston Lighting and Street Railway Systems, 1883-92 
Arc Lighting  DC Incandescenta  AC Incandescentb  Street Railwaysc 
Number of  Number of  Number of  Number of  Miles of 

























2 1.840  29  11,275 
39,936  78  59,330  23  11,100 
51,621  200‘  120,380  30‘  200‘ 
68,203  400‘  281,555  92  70  1  420 
87,131  616,355  145  1,532  1,160 
100,293  806,500  204  2,769  2,364 
Sources: Annual Reports of the Thornson-Houston  Electric Company, 1888-189 I : “Exhibit: The Following List of Thomson-Houston Plants,” 1888, Thomson Papers, 
American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia. 
dFirst  introduced in  1886. 
bFirst introduced in  1887. 
‘First introduced in  1888. 
“s  of  1 January 1883. 
‘These totals include both arc and incandescent lighting stations. Approximately five hundred companies operated both arc and incandescent systems. 
There is a discrepancy in the sources as to how many companies were using Thomson-Houston equipment in 1891. Whereas the annual reporf gives 755, Thomson- 
Houston also published a list claiming 666 central stations; see table 3.2. 67  Coordination of Business Organization and Technological Innovation 
the business organization in place to market, finance, and install arc-lighting 
stations, it was easy to have the same salesmen and engineers sell and service 
other electrical products. As early as 1883, Coffin asked Thomson to develop 
an incandescent-lighting  system, and the company began installing incandes- 
cent plants in  1885. Similarly, Coffin took an interest in selling DC motors 
that could be installed on arc-lighting circuits, in building AC stations, and in 
entering the field of electric street railways. Anxious to expand and diversify 
their customer loads, utilities readily purchased such new products. Hence, the 
manufacturer  was taking advantage of  economies of  scope, and the utilities 
were capitalizing on economies of scale. 
These actions reveal that Coffin favored product innovation. Just as he had 
been willing to use new machines in his shoe factory to produce more shoes 
to reach new markets, so Coffin supported the development of new electrical 
products. With new products such as motors and AC lighting, he believed that 
he could better serve existing markets as well as expand into new areas. As 
Thomson recalled, Coffin frequently visited the Lynn factory to see the latest 
inventions, and he invariably  asked, “How soon can you have that done?” or 
“How long will it take to do  that?”” As long as product innovations facilitated 
market  development  (which  they  generally  did), Coffin  was an  ardent  sup- 
porter of Thomson’s efforts. Thus, along with the development of central sta- 
tions, Coffin helped  establish production  innovation  as a key component of 
Thornson-Houston’s overall strategy. 
In sum, Coffin and his group possessed a market-oriented mind-set: respond 
to the market quickly, give the people the products they want, and, if necessary, 
devise the means whereby customers can finance their purchases. In general, 
they favored product innovation, because  it promised  to help them  increase 
market share. 
3.3.2  Manufacturing Dynamos: Edwin Wilbur Rice, Jr., and the 
Engineering Group 
In  implementing  the  central-station  strategy,  the  marketing  and  finance 
group contributed much to the rapid growth of the Thomson-Houston Electric 
Company. But marketing and finance are not the only functions that a machine- 
building firm must perform; to be successful, it must also address a host of 
manufacturing and engineering problems. Frequently it is not easy to transfer 
a new invention from the laboratory to the factory floor. Often the invention 
must be redesigned to simplify manufacture. Occasionally it may require new 
materials and production methods. At Thomson-Houston, for instance, Thom- 
son and the other engineers were obliged to find better insulating materials as 
well as to devise faster ways to wind the coils used in dynamos, transformers, 
and arc lights. Once any invention goes into production, raw materials must be 
11. Elihu Thomson (hereafter cited as ET), “He Invented Methods of Business,” in “Charles A. 
Coffin Mourned by Industry,” Elecrrical  World, 24 July 1926, 189. 68  W.  Bernard Carlson 
kept  in  stock, machine  tools  installed  and  maintained,  and  workers  hired, 
trained, and paid. As the volume of production grows, the layout of the plant 
and the work flow must be carefully planned, and cost accounting is needed to 
prevent waste and confusion. Naturally, if new inventions  are introduced or 
existing products modified, then the entire factory process may have to be re- 
vised and reestablished. 
Because neither Coffin nor the Lynn syndicate was familiar with the intrica- 
cies of electrical manufacture, Coffin and the  syndicate willingly  delegated 
responsibility for the company’s factory in  Lynn to Edwin  Wilbur Rice, Jr. 
Rice had served as Thomson’s assistant, helping out with the drafting, building 
models, and winding armatures. Working with Thomson, Rice learned not only 
the craft of electrical invention but also how to convert Thomson’s inventions 
from experimental models to manufactured products. On coming to Lynn, he 
was put in charge of  assistants in the Model Room, or Experimental Depart- 
ment, but in February 1885, he was promoted to factory superintendent.I2 
As factory superintendent, Rice was respoilsible for all the work done at the 
Lynn works. Referred to by the workmen as the Lights, this plant was initially 
run  like  other New  England  factories. Various rooms  or departments  were 
equipped for machining dynamo parts, assembling lamp mechanisms, and test- 
ing dynamos. As long as the firm’s product line consisted only of  dynamos, 
arc lights, and regulators, Rice probably supervised operations by  watching 
and participating in the work on the factory floor; there was no need for spe- 
cialization  or formal procedures. Wherever possible,  Rice sought to improve 
production by rearranging the machine tools, introducing better assembly tech- 
niques, and designing special-purpose machinery. As a typical factory superin- 
tendent, Rice strove to lower manufacturing costs, thus permitting the firm to 
cut prices or expand its profit margin.” 
Changing circumstances, however, soon forced Rice and the factory crew to 
modify their routine. As the company’s salesmen sold more arc-lighting sys- 
tems, production had to be expanded. By November  1886, for example, the 
company had so many orders that Thomson estimated that the factory had a 
backlog of two thousand lights. In response to the growing demand, Thomson- 
Houston constructed at least one new factory building every year from 1883  to 
1892 (see figs. 3.2 and 3.3). Each new factory had to be planned and built in a 
short time. During these years, the workforce jumped from forty-five to thirty- 
12. “Career of the New President,”Electrical World, 21 June 1913, 1345-46:  testimony of E. W. 
Rice, in “Testimony for Thomson in Rebuttal,” Patent Interference no. 9,421, Thomson v. Joseph 
Olmsted (subject: cutout apparatus  for electric  lamps), Records of  the Patent Office, RG-241, 
National Archives, Washington Records Center, Su$land, Maryland (hereafter cited as NARS), 
16-17. 
13. “The Thomson-Houston Factory, Lynn, Mass.,’’ Electrical  World, 29 August 1885.83; “Tes- 
timony for Thomson,” paper 48, Patent Interference no. 15,876, Thomson v. Dyer (subject: insulat- 
ing materials), NARS, 28 (hereafter cited as “Testimony for Thomson,” Intf. 15,876):  “Misgivings 
as to Business. . . ,” Lynn Item, 24 October 1933, Lynn Historical Society; “Electric Light machin- 
ery. Sept. 1883. Completion of the Factory at West Lynn . . . ,”  Hall of History Collection. Fig. 3.2  Thomson-Houston factory in Lynn, Massachusetts,  in 1884 
Source: Scrapbook 1, Thomson Collection, Lynn Historical Society. 
Fig. 3.3  Thomson-Houston factory in Lynn, Massachusetts, in 1891 
Source: Scrapbook 1, Thomson Collection, Lynn Historical Society. 70  W.  Bernard Carlson 
five hundred men. And just as demand was increasing, the company was also 
introducing  new  products;  from  1885 to  1892, the Lynn factory turned  out 
incandescent lamps, transformers, motors, meters, and trolley cars. To be com- 
petitive  with  Brush, Edison,  and Westinghouse,  Thomson-Houston  offered 
those products in a variety of sizes and continually strove to improve them.I4 
To  cope with the growing volume of production and the complexities of an 
expanding product line, Rice gradually created his own functional  staff (fig. 
3.4). To  equip and maintain the factories, Rice selected Isaac E Baker, an En- 
glishman who had formerly installed incandescent  stations for US.  Electric, 
to serve as mechanical superintendent. Daniel M. Barton monitored the flow 
of work through the factory and ordered supplies. Making up the weekly pay- 
roll, which typically was over $40,000, was George E. Emmons.” 
As the number of products  manufactured  in Lynn grew, Rice hired more 
engineers and assigned them to the major product areas. Again, that arrange- 
ment reflected the fact that the company sold different products for different 
applications. Walter H. Knight, a pioneer in electric traction, served as chief 
engineer. It appears that the product engineers were self-educated, but many 
of  the engineers on the staff below  them were college graduates.  By  1887, 
Thomson-Houston was regularly hiring young men from MIT’s Electrical En- 
gineering Department and Cornell’s Sibley College of Engineering. Some nov- 
ice engineers also served as “experts,” who were sent out to install electrical 
plants. Through his staff of engineers, Rice was able to monitor the work flow, 
improve manufacturing procedures, and design products.Ih 
Whereas the engineering staff provided advice and information, a Factory 
Committee, organized by Rice in 1890,  made decisions about operations. Con- 
sisting of Barton, Baker, and Emmons, the committee met at least once a week 
to handle employee problems,  discuss new products,  set production  targets, 
and “exercise a general control over the foremen” (Shaw 1892, 657). Rice and 
the Factory Committee exerted final control over all aspects of the factory, and 
the managerial and engineering staff primarily played an advisory role in day- 
to-day operations. 
In running the Lynn factory, Rice and his staff developed their own mind- 
set. Deeply involved in the details of manufacturing, their basic premise was 
that they should help the firm earn money by reducing production costs. Wher- 
14. ET to Edward F.  Peck, I3 November 1886, TP, LB 9/86-3187,  88-89:  Anniml Sfntenrerir oj 
the Thomson-Housfon Electric Compan, 2 February  189 I (hereafter cited as T-H Annucrl Sfcrre- 
menf, 1891  ), Historical File, General Electric Company, Schenectady, New York. 
15. Shaw 1892, especially 655-56;  memoir of Hermann Lemp, 2 July 1938, TP, Biographical 
Material; for information on Isaac F. Baker, see his testimony in “Testimony for Elihu Thomson,” 
paper 129, Patent Interference no. 15,511, Pratr and Johns v. Thomson (subject: composition for 
insulating material), NARS (hereafter cited as “Testimony,” Intf. 15,5  I I); for biographical infor- 
mation on George E. Ernmons, see his recollections, Hammond File, L13-19. 
16. Shaw  1892, 658; ET to  Theodore  H. Seyfert, 23  September  1887, TP,  LB 3/87-4/88, 
489-90;  E. E. Boyer, “Ohservations on Historical Notes . . . ,”  Hall of Hictory Collection; C. B. 
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ever possible, they strove to modify products so that they would be simpler to 
manufacture and install. The group also supported procedures that permitted 
greater control over the flow of  work through the factory; Barton  was quite 
proud of his system of wallboards,  in which plugs were inserted to track the 
construction of  large machines on the factory floor. Rice and the production 
managers also instituted a system of written work orders that allowed them to 
assign workers to specific projects and at the same time monitor costs.” 
As to product innovation, however, Rice and the engineers were cautious. 
Although some innovations were necessary for the firm to remain competitive, 
Rice and his staff soon learned that other changes upset the factory routine.’* 
Their tendency to approach product changes skeptically was exacerbated by 
the fact that the factory was continually expanding in order to meet demand. 
Consequently, even though Rice had worked closely with Thomson in devel- 
oping new products, Rice’s group was not always supportive of Thomson’s ef- 
forts to improve his inventions. There was a limit to the confusion and change 
they could tolerate and still get the dynamos out the door. 
3.3.3  Designing Dynamos: Thomson and the Model Room 
Although Rice and the manufacturing group may have had mixed feelings 
about  innovation,  it  was  nonetheless  essential  to  the  well-being  of  the 
Thomson-Houston Electric Company. Throughout the  1880s, the firm gener- 
ally supported product innovation. First, Coffin and the marketing group fa- 
vored innovation because they saw it as a means to reach new customers and 
to acquire a larger share of the central-station market. Second, innovation was 
necessary  for survival  in  a highly  competitive industry.  By  the  mid-l880s, 
there were  nearly  fifty arc-light manufacturers,  all competing  for a portion 
of the evolving  market.  Whereas  creative financing arrangements  and price 
cutting could be used to sell more equipment, customers also responded favor- 
ably  to manufacturers  with high-quality  products.  As Harold  Passer  (1953, 
43-45)  has observed, electric lighting was a capital good whose purchasers 
had to make complex calculations concerning both  original investment  and 
operating costs; consequently,  they frequently chose equipment on the basis 
of its efficiency and reliability, rather than  simply its price. In that situation, 
Thomson-Houston sought additional improvements and accessories that would 
accentuate those characteristics in their lighting systems. Third, but hardly the 
least important, the firm pursued innovation because of Thomson’s presence. 
A key member of  the firm, Thomson considered invention his personal do- 
main, and he actively encouraged  the company to make full use of  his ex- 
pertise. 
Unlike Edison and Westinghouse, who took an active part in the manage- 
17. Shaw 1892, 655-56;  “Testimony,” Intf. 15,511, 121-23;  samples of  the work orders can be 
18. ET to F.  P.  Fish, 1 October 1889, TP, LB 4/89-1/90,  502-4. 
found scattered throughout GE Transfiles, TP. 73  Coordination of Business Organization and Technological Innovation 
ment of their companies, Thomson concentrated on invention and engineering. 
Having developed a distaste for business matters prior to coming to Lynn, he 
was content to leave the problems of raising capital and selling lights to Coffin 
and the Boston office. “I have as little as possible to do with the business of 
the Company,” Thomson explained in  1888, “my  work being  in the line of 
development of Lpparatus and the production of new inventions.”  l9 
Instead  of  playing  a  prominent  role  in  the  day-to-day  management  of 
Thomson-Houston, Thomson created a niche for himself in the Model Room at 
the Lynn factory. Although his work area could have been called a laboratory, 
Thomson referred to it as his Model Room, because the primary work per- 
formed there  was the construction of models for testing and patenting.  The 
Model Room was equipped with machine tools, electrical instruments, and a 
special switchboard for supplying electricity at various current strengths and 
voltages. In addition, the Model Room had its own supply room, patent library, 
and offices for Thomson and his assistants. Although adjacent to the factory 
floor, the Model Room was “off-limits” to employees and visitors, in order to 
prevent industrial espionage.2o 
Assisting Thomson in the Model Room were skilled machinists and clerks 
(fig. 3.5). The machinists were responsible for constructing models of Thom- 
son’s  inventions,  and  the clerks handled  correspondence  and the paperwork 
related to patents. Thomson’s clerks followed with great interest the technical 
work in the  Model Room and  sometimes even made technical  suggestions. 
For instance, J. W.  Gibboney, Thomson’s personal secretary, suggested using 
jeweled bearings in order to reduce friction and hence the current necessary to 
drive  the  earliest  recording  wattmeter.  Supplementing  the  machinists  and 
clerks were a draftsman and one or two office boys. 
Although Thomson  preferred  to work with  a small group of  handpicked 
machinists, after 1888 he was joined in the Model Room by several inventors 
who  came to Thomson-Houston  as  a  result  of  Coffin’s  merger  campaign. 
Whereas Charles Van Depoele appears to have worked independently on elec- 
tric motors and  streetcars, Merle J. Wightman  and Hermann Lemp worked 
on projects under Thomson’s direction. Unlike the machinists,  Van Depoele, 
Wightman, and Lemp shared with Thomson the privilege of filing patent appli- 
cations for their ideas.21 
19. ET to H. B. Rand, 28 December 1888,  TP, LB 4/88-4/89,586. 
20. Shaw 1892, 653, 656; “Testimony,” Intf. 15,511, 53; “Recollections of A. L. Rohrer,” Ham- 
mond File, J217-23,  especially J221; ET to Charles A. Coffin (hereafter CAC), 12 April 1887, 
21. See the fol!owing  letters in TP: ET to S. A. Barton, 19 February 1885, LB 5/85-8/85,  130; 
ET to H. C. Townsend, 6 September  1886, LB  3/86-9/86,  243-44;  ET to James J.  Wood, LB 
4/88-4/89,  557-58;  ET to CAC, 1 November 1888, LB 4/88-4/89,  431-33;  ET to J. P.  Caveling, 
6 September  1890, LB  1/90-11/90,  841. See also “Recollections of  L. T. Robinson,” Hammond 
File, L1109-14;  Lemp memoir; and “Testimony in Chief and Rebuttal on Behalf of  Thornson,” 
paper 94, Patent Interference no. 13,332, Edison v. Thomson (subject: incandescent-lamp cutout), 
NARS, 19-29. 
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Working with the Model Room staff, Thomson believed in building the best 
possible products. Thomson chose to design high-quality products because he 
found them personally and intellectually satisfying. Moreover, by being dedi- 
cated to regular improvement of the firm’s products, Thomson ensured that he 
and the Model Room would have a continuing role to play in the company. 
But  beyond  these reasons,  Thomson was  confident that the best  product 
would, in the long run, capture the largest share of the market. Seeing that his 
arc-light system sold well because it was efficient and reliable, he strove to 
maximize  similar characteristics  in his other inventions. What is significant 
about Thomson’s mind-set is that it was not  shared by all groups within the 
firm. As has been  suggested,  the marketing  and manufacturing  groups had 
their own distinctive mind-sets about how the firm should operate and the role 
that product innovation should play in the firm’s strategy. In sum, the manage- 
ment of  Thomson-Houston was hardly monolithic, but rather made up of sev- 
eral groups, each with their own mind-set. 
3.3.4  How Did Thomson-Houston Compare with Its Rivals? 
Thomson-Houston  became a leading firm in electrical  manufacturing  be- 
cause it brought  together  marketing  strategy, manufacturing  capability,  and 
product innovation. Led by the triumvirate of Coffin, Rice, and Thomson, the 
firm committed itself to selling electrical equipment to a customer it helped 
invent, the central-station utility. To help reach this new class of customers, the 
triumvirate  organized Thomson-Houston along functional  lines. Coffin  per- 
sonally supervised the marketing function and built a strong organization for 
sales and finance. At the same time, Rice built  a large factory  in Lynn for 
manufacturing  dynamos and lights. Significantly, Coffin realized  that to de- 
velop the central-station  strategy fully it would  be necessary  for Thomson- 
Houston to offer a range of electrical products; in order to sell equipment to 
central stations in every town and city, the firm had to offer generators, lights, 
motors, and distribution networks suitable to a variety of needs. This realiza- 
tion led Coffin to encourage Thomson to invent new devices and systems. 
Thomson-Houston’s  strength can be readily seen by comparing its perfor- 
mance  with  its  competitors, both  large  and  small.  As  table  3.2  reveals, 
Thomson-Houston  surpassed all other firms in installing central stations. Not 
surprisingly, its substantial investment in a large sales force, factory, and prod- 
uct improvement allowed it to surpass and then absorb many of the smaller 
firms in the industry. 
At the same time, Thomson-Houston performed better than its major com- 
petitors, Edison and Westinghouse, because neither of these firms was able to 
effectively  integrate  marketing,  manufacture,  and  innovation.  During  the 
1880s, Edison and his associates maintained a loose and poorly coordinated 
confederation of  companies for manufacturing and distributing his incandes- 
cent system. Only in 1889 did Henry Villard succeed in welding these compa- 
nies together as the Edison General Electric  Company. Even then, however, 76  W.  Bernard Carlson 



















































Source: “Electric Light and Electric Railway Statistics,” Electrical World,  14 February 1891, 110. 
dPresumably  includes stations using arc, DC incandescent, and AC incandescent lights. 
Edison General had difficulties  with coordinating the key functions. Edison 
had opened a substantial laboratory at West Orange, New Jersey, which he 
assumed would be funded by  Edison  General but where he refused to work 
exclusively on the products needed by the company. Samuel Insull successfully 
created a national sales organization for Edison General, but he found it more 
difficult to improve manufacturing at the firm’s Schenectady plant. Insull’s ef- 
forts to enlarge the plant were limited by a scarcity of capital. Intent on gaining 
control of the utility industry through a holding company, the North American 
Company, Villard directed most of  Edison General’s assets in that direction, 
and left Insull in the difficult situation of paying for long-term factory improve- 
ments  with  short-term banknotes.  Thus, while Edison  General  possessed  a 
marketing organization, it was weak in terms of product innovation and pro- 
duction. Not surprisingly, Edison General was badly damaged when Villard’s 
North American Company failed during the Baring financial crisis of  1890. 
Like  Edison  General,  the  Westinghouse  Company  failed  to integrate  all 
three functions, but its problems stemmed more from finance and marketing. 
In shifting his attention from his railroad inventions (the air-brake and signal- 
ing systems) in the mid-l880s, George Westinghouse  wisely hired a number 
of electrical inventors and engineers, including William  Stanley and Nikola 
Tesla, and hence ensured that he had ready access to new technological devel- 
opments. To manufacture the electrical systems developed by his inventors and 
engineers, Westinghouse  built factories in Pittsburgh and Newark. However, 
his weakness was in marketing; Westinghouse depended on a small sales force 
working on commission out of offices in six or seven major cities, and he in- 
sisted on closing many of  the major deals himself. Westinghouse  also bank- 
rolled the early development of his electrical company himself, which meant 
that he never developed the strong relationship with a banking house needed 
to float bond and stock issues or to help finance central stations purchasing his 77  Coordination of Business Organization and Technological Innovation 
equipment. Consequently, again like the Edison organization, the financial cri- 
sis of  1890 found Westinghouse bankrupt, and he was only able to reorganize 
with the help of financiers August Belmont and Henry L. Higginson (Carlson 
Of the three major firms in the electrical industry, Thomson-Houston  was 
thus the only firm that successfully coordinated all three functions. As a result, 
Thomson-Houston was able to take over Edison General in  1892 to form the 
General Electric Company. Moreover, throughout the 1890s and into the twen- 
tieth century, Coffin and GE were able to continually maneuver Westinghouse 
into a secondary position in the electrical industry. 
The  significant  differences  in  structure  and  performance  of  Thomson- 
Houston, Edison  General,  and Westinghouse highlight the  weakness of  the 
rational-actor approach and the need for an organizationai model. Following 
the rational-actor model, one would assume that the managers at each of these 
firms had  access to approximately the same information about markets and 
technology and that the forces of competition would have led them to create 
similar organizations.  Yet  the historical record  shows that the  managers  of 
these companies followed diverse paths, either because they perceived the mar- 
kets and technology in different ways or because they were unable to build the 
necessary internal coalition of business and technical experts. Consequently, if 
we wish to understand how firms evolve their strategy and structure, we must 
look beyond a rational-actor model of the firm and supplant it with an organiza- 
tional approach. 
1991,275-91). 
3.4  Taking an Organizational Approach: The Case of 
AC Lighting System 
Although Coffin, Thomson, and Rice clearly made a series of  sound deci- 
sions and brought the right functions inside Thomson-Houston, one should not 
assume that the decision-making process was smooth and orderly. Indeed, if 
we peek inside Thomson-Houston  during the  188Os, we do not discover the 
logical world suggested by the organizational chart in figure 3.1, but rather one 
marked by the give-and-take of interest-group politics. To illustrate this, let us 
look at how the company developed an AC system for incandescent lighting. 
This system was vital to Thomson-Houston because it permitted the company 
to compete directly with Westinghouse and Edison for a new segment of the 
central-station market, namely, small cities and towns. In telling the story of 
this system, we shall see how the process of innovation at Thomson-Houston 
was strongly influenced by the interaction of the three groups within the firm. 
3.4.1  Identifying AC Incandescent Lighting as a Product 
Thomson had been fascinated by alternating current from the outset of his 
career as an inventor. In 1878, he and Houston had built a set of arc lights and 
a generator that employed alternating current and induction coils. The purpose 78  W. Bernard Carlson 
of  the induction coils was to render each lamp in a series circuit independent. 
In this way, Thomson and Houston solved the problem of subdividing the elec- 
tric light. Previously, electrical inventors had been able to run only one large 
arc light from a single dynamo, but now they were able to use a dynamo to 
power several smaller lights. The two men drew up patent applications for their 
AC system, but they soon set them aside when two Philadelphia businessmen 
offered to fund a DC arc-lighting system (Carlson 1991, 96-105). 
In  1885, after he had successfully introduced  an arc-lighting  system with 
Coffin’s help, Thomson reviewed his earlier work with induction coils and be- 
gan to sketch several new systems. Like other inventors, he sensed that it would 
be desirable to develop a distribution system whereby power could be transmit- 
ted to incandescent lights over distances greater than one or two miles, then 
the physical limit for existing DC systems. Because of this limitation, DC in- 
candescent stations were erected only in towns and cities with sufficient popu- 
lation density to pay for the costs of installing large copper mains. To overcome 
these difficulties, in March 1885 Thomson sketched an AC system using in- 
duction coils with their primary windings in parallel, a system that would step 
the voltage down from 1,000 to 110 volts. 
The advantage of  using the higher voltage was that it permitted  efficient 
transmission  of  power  over long distances.  Thomson also included  several 
safety devices to minimize the danger of electrocution from the high voltage. 
On the primary or high-voltage side of the transformer, he inserted a fuse, and 
on the secondary or low-voltage side, he added a ground connection. In case 
of a short circuit between the primary and secondary coils, that ground connec- 
tion would conduct the high-voltage current away from the electric lights. In- 
clusion of such safety devices was part of Thomson’s business-technological 
mind-set: build a system that is both reliable and not harmful to the customer.** 
In designing that system in early 1885, Thomson was not especially con- 
cerned with introducing it commercially; rather, he considered the invention as 
one of several projects he might pursue. Instead, it was Coffin who first real- 
ized the commercial potential of an AC lighting system. During a trip to Eu- 
rope in  1885, Coffin saw a demonstration of an AC system developed by the 
Hungarian inventors Zipernowsky,  Blathy, and Deri (ZBD). Although Coffin 
always claimed that he knew nothing of the intricacies of electrical technology, 
he quickly realized from the ZBD system that alternating current could be used 
to build central stations in smaller cities and towns. On his return, he urged 
22. Foster 1920, especially 81; “System of Electrical Distribution by Means of  Induction Coils, 
Mar 5. 85,” Exhibit no. 12, “Testimony on Behalf of Elihu Thomson and Edwin J. Houston . . . ,” 
Patent Interference no. 13,761 (subject: transformer distribution systems), Hall of History Collec- 
tion, 307; ET, “Induction Apparatus Interf. with Gravier,” July-August  1884, TP; ET to  H. C. 
Townsend, 10 April 1885,  TP, LB 5/83-8/85,65-67,  and 110-12;  ET to J. A. Fleming, 12 October 
1885, TP, LB 8/85-3/86,  82-83;  ET to Townsend & MacArthur, 6 January  1887, TP, LB 9/86- 
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Thomson to pursue his work with induction coils and to file additional patent 
applications for parallel circuits as soon as possible.23  Through late 1885 and 
early 1886, Thomson tested an AC system. 
Because safety was to be an important feature of his system, Thomson con- 
tinued to improve the designs of the fuses and other safety devices. By June 
1886, he had run an experimental AC power line between two buildings at the 
Lynn plant to deliver current to incandescent  lamps. By  the year’s  end, the 
company  was advertising AC generators  in its catalog, emphasizing  that it 
could furnish power to incandescent lights over long distances using wires that 
were smaller than those used in DC systems. Although the catalog described 
four generator models, none had actually been  sold or installed.24 From an 
organizational perspective, work went forward on the AC system because two 
interest groups agreed that it was a worthwhile project: Thomson’s group had 
already done preliminary work in the area, and Coffin’s group had decided that 
an AC system would help them reach new customers. 
In the meantime, however, George Westinghouse  was making progress in 
developing his own AC system for incandescent lighting. First, with the help 
of  Frank  L. Pope,  an  independent  consulting  engineer, Westinghouse  pur- 
chased the American rights to a transformer distribution system developed in 
England by Lucien Gaulard and John Gibbs. Second, Westinghouse supported 
William Stanley’s research aimed at improving the transformer, which led to a 
successful demonstration  of  AC distribution  in  March  1886 in Great  Bar- 
rington, Massachusetts. Westinghouse engineers followed up Stanley’s success 
by redesigning  the transformer during the summer of  1886. By  intensively 
funding development in this way, Westinghouse was able to install its first AC 
system in Buffalo in November 1886.25 
23. For a discussion of the work of  Gibbs and Gaulard and Zipernowsky, Blathy, and Deri, see 
Hughes  1983, 86-98.  For  an early  description of  the ZBD system, see ‘Wemating Electric- 
Current Machines,” Elecfrical World, 3 1  May  1884, 173-74.  For Coffin’s interest in  European 
developments, see ET to G.  Cutter, 7 October 1885, TP, LB 8/85-3/86,  76-80.  and ET to H. C. 
Townsend, 23 October 1885, TP, LB 83-1  1/85,249-50.  On learning of the ZBD system, Thomson 
wrote to  several people  and claimed that the ZBD  system was  a duplicate of  the one he  had 
sketched in  1879: see ET to C. J. Wharton, 21 September 1885, TP, LB 8/85-3186.  35-37;  ET to 
Edwin J. Houston (hereafter EJH), [28 September-3  October  18851, TP, LB 8/85-3/86,  55-56; 
ET to Laing, Wharton & Down, 15 October 1885, TP, LB 8185-3/86,93-94:  and ET to EJH, 17 
October 1885, LB 8/85-3/86,  103. 
24. ET, “Electric Induction Apparatus,” 11 June 1886, TP, LB 3/86-2/89,  168-72;  ET to CAC, 
5 February 1887, TP, LB 9/86-3/87,334-37;  ET to Townsend & MacArthur, 6 January 1887, TP, 
LB 9/86-3/87,223:  ET to Townsend & MacArthur, 1 and 19 March 1888, TP, LB 3/87-4/88,884, 
921-22;  “Extracts (or Summaries) of Testimony in Patent Infringement Suit of General Electric 
Co. vs. Butler Company,” Hammond File, J457-59;  “Catalogue of Parts of Apparatus Manufac- 
tured by the Thomson-Houston Electric Co . . . ,” 1886, Thomson Collection, MIT Archives, Cam- 
bridge. 
25. Frank L. Pope, in discussion of “The Distribution of Electricity by  Secondary Generators,” 
Telegraphic Journal and Electrical Review, 15 April 1887,349-54,  especially 349; Hughes 1983, 
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Westinghouse gained an important advantage over Thomson-Houston by se- 
curing a broad patent for an AC distribution system with transformers in paral- 
lel. In contrast, all of Thomson’s patent applications for AC distribution were 
rejected in the fall of  1886. This put the Thomson-Houston Electric Company 
in the defensive position of having to contest or else bypass the Westinghouse 
patent.26 
Thomson responded to the Westinghouse patent for AC distribution by filing 
additional applications based on his early work with induction coils and arc 
lamps. Thomson  submitted these  applications not  only  to  claim  what  he 
thought he had previously invented but also to “render it inconvenient for rivals 
to get around them.”27  In addition, he continued to experiment in the Model 
Room with different circuit configurations, hoping to find a way to circumvent 
the Westinghouse patent 
3.4.2  The Groups Bargain and Fight 
Nonetheless, by early 1887 Coffin and the marketing group were beginning 
to wonder whether perhaps the Model Room was not working fast enough. 
Why was Westinghouse already installing AC  equipment, and not Thomson- 
Houston? Had not Thomson been working on patent applications for several 
months before Westinghouse had even ordered a Gaulard-Gibbs transformer 
from Europe? In February 1887, Thomson admitted to Coffin that work on the 
AC  system was  proceeding slowly. First, Thomson explained that although 
they had been working as rapidly as possible, “the development of the system 
had outgrown the model room, which is only adapted to producing small mod- 
els and nothing of  very large size.” Thomson would have drawn on the re- 
sources of  the factory as a whole, but the production department was over- 
whelmed with filling back orders. In other words, manufacturing was too busy 
to help development. But rather than simply blame manufacturing, Thomson 
offered a second revealing reason: he was determined to introduce a complete 
AC  system, with generators, regulators, lamps, transformers, and safety de- 
vices all matched to each other, and designing such a system would take time. 
He believed that an AC system designed as a single entity would be the most 
reliable; to quote him again, “when we enter this field we wish to . . . be sure 
of success from the start with a complete and economical system, and the pre- 
26. L. Gaulard and J. D. Gibbs, “System of  Electrical Distribution,” U.S. Patent 351,589  (26 
October  1886); Kennedy  1887; “Specification of  Elihu Thomson, Lynn, Mass. Distribution of 
Electric Currents,” 9 October 1886, TP, LB 3/86-2189,232-40;  ET to T-H Elec. Co., 28 September 
1886, TP, LB 9/86-3/87,  18-19;  ET to Townsend & MacArthur,  19 November  1886, TP,  LB 
9/86-3/87,  95-96;  ET to H. N. Batchelder, 8 December 1886, TP, LB 9/86-3/87,  133-34;  ET to 
Townsend & MacArthur, 10 December 1886, LB 9/86-3/87,  141. 
27. ET to CAC, 5 February 1887, TP, LB 9/86-3187,334-37.  See also ET to H. C. Townsend, 
9 November 1886, TP, LB 3186-2B9.241-43;  ET to Townsend & MacArthur, 23 November 1886, 
TP, LB 9/86-3/87,  103; ET to Townsend & MacArthur, 21 January  1887, TP,  LB 9/86-3187, 
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paratory work that we have done will, we think, tell in the end.”28  Here is a 
clear statement of Thomson’s belief that the best-designed product will in the 
long run be the most profitable. 
In terms of  group dynamics, the situation had progressed  to the point that 
marketing  was  mistrustful of  development,  and the development  group re- 
sponded with a statement of its goals. The situation might have deteriorated 
further, but Thomson improved matters by adjusting his technology to the mar- 
keting strategy. Rather than insist that innovation could proceed only toward 
his technically perfect system, Thomson redirected his efforts so as to improve 
the company’s short-term marketing position. To reduce the threat of patent 
litigation, Thomson helped the company arrange a patent-sharing agreement 
with Westinghouse.  During a meeting of the American Institute of Electrical 
Engineers in March 1887, Thomson met with Pope and discussed the desirabil- 
ity of cooperating rather than competing in the AC field. After several meet- 
ings,  officials  from  Thomson-Houston  and  Westinghouse  reached  an 
agreement in August  1887. In return for a license to sell Thomson-Houston 
arc-lighting equipment, Westinghouse allowed Thomson-Houston to manufac- 
ture AC systems without fear of infringing the Westinghouse AC distribution 
patent. Although this agreement was terminated within two years because the 
Westinghouse patent was ruled invalid in court, it did give Thomson-Houston 
time in 1887 and 1888 to improve its AC equipment.29 
Knowing that a patent-sharing agreement could be only a temporary expedi- 
ent, Thomson next initiated a new strategy to bypass the Westinghouse patent. 
Because  Westinghouse  controlled  the  right  to the broad principle  of  using 
transformers for distribution, Thomson filed patents in 1888 on the designs of 
the most efficient transformers. Thus, the Westinghouse  company would be 
unable to use its rights to apply the broad principle, because all of  the best 
transformer designs would be owned by Thomson-Houston.  In pursuing that 
strategy, Thomson filed patents for transformers with laminated cores of differ- 
ent shapes, and he began using an oil insulation bath.30 
Still another way  in which Thomson directed invention toward short-term 
marketing needs was through the exploitation of what he called “the principle 
of  induction-repulsion.’’ In  1886 Thomson  discovered  how  a magnetic field 
created by  an alternating current passing through an electromagnet could be 
used to create rotary  motion.  Excited by  this discovery, Thomson used it to 
develop an AC motor and improved measuring instruments. In staking out his 
28. ET to CAC, 5 February 1887, TP, LB 9/86-3/87,334-37;  ET to E. F.  Peck, 22 March 1887, 
LB 9/86-3/87,470-7  1. 
29. Frank L. Pope to ET, 23 March  1887, Collected Letters; ET to CAC, 24 March  1887, TP, 
LB  3/87-4/88,  I; Passer 1953, 145-47. 
30. ET to Townsend & MacArthur, 18 January 1887, TP, LB  9/86-3/87,265-66;  ET to CAC, 
20 November 1889, TP,  LB 4/89-1/90,  729-30;  Walter S. Moody to  J. W.  Harnrnond, 15 April 
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claims for these inventions, Thomson  emphasized  that he had discovered a 
principle, in the belief that it could provide the company with general control 
over the applications derived from it. Over the next two years, Thomson per- 
fected  these  inventions,  giving  Thomson-Houston  new  AC  products  that 
helped it gain a share of the market.31 
Thomson began to redirect his development work toward short-term market- 
ing needs in early 1887 and pursued that approach into 1889. Early on, Thom- 
son’s efforts began to pay off. In May 1887, the firm shipped its first AC ma- 
chine to the Lynn Electric Lighting Company, and by  the year’s  end it had 
installed twenty-two more systems. The first Thomson-Houston AC systems 
were installed in smaller cities, such as New Rochelle, New York; Kansas City, 
Missouri; Putnam, Connecticut; and Syracuse, New York, where the popula- 
tion density was too low to offset the initial cost of a DC incandescent system. 
Anxious to show his confidence in the new  system and to have a full-scale 
circuit on which to test new devices, Thomson installed one of the new trans- 
formers and incandescent lamps in his home in Lynn. Because of his concern 
with safety, he employed in his home all of the safety devices he had created- 
the grounded secondary, fuses, and lightning arresters. He offered to promote 
the completed AC lighting system by  writing an article for Electrical  World, 
but he did so asking “whether my time would be more valuable to the Company 
employed on new work and in new fields rather than in describing apparatus 
and arrangements that are comparatively old with us.”32 
As Thomson directed the work of  the Model Room to suit the needs and 
expectations of the marketing team, he proposed that marketing help imple- 
ment some of  his ideals. In particular, Thomson was anxious to see that his 
notions about the safe use of alternating current be implemented. Maintaining 
that the best system was a safe system, Thomson remarked that “I am a believer 
in the establishment of all safeguards which conduce to the good working of a 
system, especially  when they do not add greatly to the cost of making the 
installation.” More than just fulfilling his technological idealism, Thomson was 
confident that his safety inventions  should be part of the marketing strategy 
used to fight Westinghouse. Once Westinghouse’s broad patent for transformer 
distribution had been ruled invalid, Thomson suggested that all central stations 
31. [ET], “Specification-Alternating  Current Motor Device,” 22  December  1886, TP,  LB 
3/86-2/89,  265-76;  ET to G. Cutter, 17 December 1886, TP, LB 9/96-3/87,  163-67;  ET to CAC, 
5 February 1887, TP, LB 9/96-3/87,334-37;  Thomson 1887a; H. G. Hamann and F.  G.  Vaughen, 
“Developmental Work by  Prof. Thomson on Electric Meters,” TP, Biographical Materials; [ET], 
“Specification [for liquid electric meter],” 14 October 1887, TP, LB 3/86-2/89,  19-36;  ET to CAC, 
12 March 1888, TP, LB 3187-4/88,913;  J. W.  Gibboney to S. C. Peck, 26 October 1889, TP, LB 
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32. ET to Thomson-Houston Elec. Co., 13 June 1887, TP, LB 3/87-4/88,  163-64.  The first 
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using Thomson-Houston AC equipment be fitted with the latest safety devices. 
The company should then emphasize in its advertisements how safe its installa- 
tions were in comparison with the Westinghouse plants. As a result of adverse 
publicity, Westinghouse  would then be forced to install  safety equipment as 
well. Because Thomson-Houston controlled the patents for the best safety fea- 
tures, Thomson believed that such a strategy would block Westinghouse from 
acquiring a larger share of the market for alternating current.33 
As Thomson soon learned, the difficulty with his plan was that it presumed 
that Thomson-Houston  would  encourage  its  customers  to install  safety de- 
vices. Unfortunately, that was hardly the case in 1889. Instead, it appears that 
Thomson-Houston customers frequently ignored safety equipment and careful 
installation procedures in the rush to get “on line.” Pushed by investors to begin 
selling electricity as soon as possible in order to make a return on the capital 
invested, utility operators were forced to keep their construction and installa- 
tion costs to a minimum. Utilities did not always purchase all the necessary 
safety accessories; they used poorly  insulated wire, and their linemen often 
were careless and indifferent to the special requirements of alternating current. 
Although Thomson realized that such poor practices were influenced  by  the 
competitiveness of  the  electric-lighting  field, they  nonetheless offended  his 
mind-set. “I do not believe in this kind of economy,” he warned Coffin. “Rather 
it would be better not to have the business than incur the risks which are thus 
in~olved.”)~  As an inventor, Thomson would have liked to have had control 
of  his creations from the  initial conception  to the  final installation, but he 
soon realized  that the marketing group was unwilling or unable to help him 
accomplish  this.  In  this  situation,  although  Thomson  and the  development 
group  had  adjusted  their  efforts  to  suit  marketing’s  short-term  interests, 
marketing had failed to reciprocate by promoting development’s ideas about 
safety. 
In failing to endorse Thomson’s ideas about safety, the marketing group soon 
discovered that it had lost a key ally needed for fighting in the AC-DC contro- 
versy. Lasting from 1886 to 1895, that controversy involved whether AC sys- 
tems should supplant DC systems, and it was a debate that soon included not 
simply technical matters but political and emotional issues as well. The contro- 
versy became particularly  heated in 1888 as it became clear that AC systems 
could be used to supply incandescent lighting to small cities and towns lacking 
the population density needed to support a low-voltage DC system. Unable to 
compete with Westinghouse and Thomson-Houston for that market, the Edi- 
son organization decided to challenge the AC system by questioning its safety. 
33. ET to T. F.  Gaynor, 7 March 1888, TP, LB 3/87-4/88,  900-901.  See also ET to CAC, 11 
December 1888, TP, LB 4/88-4B9.547-50. 
34. ET to CAC, I3 February 1889, TP, LB 4/88-4/89,761-66.  See also ET to CAC, 16 February 
1889, TP,  LB 4/88-4/89,  780-82;  ET  to John J. Moore,  19 October  1889, TP LB 4/98-1/90, 
594-96;  ET to Narragansett Elec. Light Co., 22 April  1890, TP, LB  1/90-11/90,  443-44;  Thom- 
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The higher voltages required for efficient transmission  by  alternating current, 
argued the Edison group, were more likely to cause injury and death.’s 
By the summer of  1889 Coffin and the marketing group were anxious to 
participate in the AC-DC debate. In all likelihood, they saw it as an opportunity 
to surpass their two rivals, Edison and Westinghouse.  Defensively, they also 
may have been concerned that the publicity about “deadly” alternating current 
might harm sales, and they wanted to reassure customers that it was safe to 
buy Thomson-Houston equipment. Because the company was already manu- 
facturing safety equipment, all that was necessary for a strong position in the 
debate was to have a leading authority promote the general use of alternating 
current. Given his established interest in electrical safety, Thomson was the 
obvious choice for this public-relations effort. 
In October 1889, Coffin asked Thomson to write an article titled “How to 
Make Electricity Safe.” Along with addressing the general issue of the safety 
of alternating current, Coffin wanted Thomson to provide a defense for AC 
power in the wake of an accident that had recently occurred at a utility in New 
York City. The utility had been using a Thomson-Houston AC system, and it 
was short-circuited when a telephone  wire fell  across the  1,000-volt power 
lines.  Much  to Coffin’s dismay, Thomson  turned down the assignment. The 
utility had done a poor job of installing its AC equipment, and Thomson felt 
that he could not personally defend such work. Unsafe installation was unac- 
ceptable to Thomson, and what was more, Thomson-Houston would not have 
been in that unfortunate defensive position had they listened to Thomson sev- 
eral months earlier.36 
At first, Thomson simply suggested that he should remain quiet rather than 
be “a stumbling block in the  way  of  the Company’s business transactions.” 
However, when Coffin pressed for a general endorsement of alternating cur- 
rent, Thomson exploded. In anger, he informed Coffin that he felt like quitting, 
because “my position with the Company has no attractions for me if my ideas 
of what is needed  to constitute good substantial work are not followed but 
personally neglected.” In a letter written on Christmas Eve  1889, he advised 
Coffin that the firm would have to recognize that he was primarily an inventor 
and would not be distracted by  writing articles for publicity purposes. With 
respect to the safety of alternating current, he refused to give a blanket endorse- 
ment. “I have no method” he wrote, “I have no panacea-for  all the ills which 
may follow the use of high potential currents under conditions usually found 
in large cities. I can no more say how to make electricity safe in such cases 
than  I can say how to make railroad travel safe, or how to make steamship 
travel safe, or how to make the use of illuminating gas safe, nor the use of 
35. Hughes 1983, 106-9; Passer 1953, 164-75;  [Harold P. Brown] to Spencer Aldrich, 6 Febru- 
36. [A. C. Bernheim] to CAC, 16 October 1889,  TP, LB 4/89-1/90,589; ET to CAC, 6 Novem- 
ary 1889, TP, LB 4/88-4/89,  771-74;  ET to CAC, 16 May  1889,  TP, Collected Letters. 
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steam boilers safe. No improvement of our modern civilization has ever been 
introduced but that involved considerable risk.”37  Because he had designed the 
AC  system,  Thomson  knew  well  the  risks  involved  in  using  it.  He  lived 
by the principle that the best system was a safe system. But when he found that 
the marketing group was interested only in promoting safety as a short-term, 
defensive measure, he refused to cooperate. They had not been willing to adapt 
marketing policy to his technological goals, and so he was unwilling to com- 
promise his principles about safety. As a result, the Thomson-Houston Electric 
Company took no public position in the AC-DC controversy, leaving the debate 
to be settled by Edison and Westinghouse,38 
Viewed in terms of  the clashing of group interests, it is easy to see why 
Thomson and the development group came to refuse to cooperate. First, Thom- 
son was finding it difficult to work with the manufacturing group. Previously, 
although they had been unable to help him with the development work in early 
1887, they had, for the most part, been willing to manufacture AC equipment 
according to Thomson’s designs. By  1889, however, the firm’s business was 
rapidly growing and expanding into the new field of electric trolleys; as a re- 
sult, the factory mushroomed in size, and the tasks of coordinating production 
became immense. These changes made the production engineers quite cau- 
tious about modifying and improving other products, because this would mean 
more confusion in the factory. Modifications might well mean that manufactur- 
ing costs would go up and reduce profits. Production’s conservative  outlook 
soon became apparent to Thomson, as when he tried to introduce an improved 
transformer design in mid- 1889. Manufacturing turned it down on the grounds 
that the new form would cost more to make than the old version, an argument 
with which Thomson had to agree. Nonetheless, he was disturbed by the event 
because it signaled that it was becoming more difficult to introduce the minor 
improvements that would ensure that the company was manufacturing the best 
possible ~ystem.~’ 
A second issue that concerned Thomson was that patent litigation was dis- 
tracting him from working on new inventions. By  1889, Thomson had filed 
375 patent applications, which had unfortunately led to a sizable amount of 
litigation. By the end of that year, he had been named in over sixty interference 
cases, many  of  which  required  extensive  testimony. In  addition, Thomson- 
37. ET to CAC, 19 October 1889, TP, LB 4/89-1/90,579-83;  ET to CAC, 20 December 1889, 
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Houston was actively suing firms that had infringed Thomson’s patent for an 
automatic dynamo regulator. Accustomed to having Thomson assist them with 
the infringement  litigation, the Thomson-Houston lawyers soon began using 
him as an expert witness in other cases. Although Thomson understood the 
importance of defending his patents, he came to question his participation in 
litigation, as it took him away from invention. Eventually he informed Coffin 
that he would no longer testify. “If I am to act as inventor for the Company,” 
he wrote,  “I  shall not  hold myself  in readiness  to be called upon as patent 
expert and handy man . . . for the more I invent, the more will my inventions 
. . . embarrass me in the future. . . . [It] is simply wasting my time to have to 
do . . . patent expert 
More than his difficulties with manufacturing or the troublesome patent liti- 
gation, Thomson was troubled  by  a third issue in  1889: his role within  the 
company. As the preceding quotation indicates, Thomson saw himself as the 
firm’s chief inventor. Many  of Thomson-Houston’s  products  were his handi- 
work, and his creative efforts had yielded handsome profits for the firm. Yet 
there were signs that Thomson might be losing his position as chief innovator. 
Beginning in 1888,  Thomson was joined in the Model Room by other inventors 
who came to Lynn as their companies were bought out by Thomson-Houston. 
Although Thomson was nominally in charge of their work, he may have been 
worried  that his own inventions would  no longer be highly  valued  by  man- 
age men^^' 
In addition to the output of these new inventors, Coffin and the marketing 
group began  to purchase  more outside  patents  in  1888. Thomson intensely 
opposed this policy, and in 1888 and 1889 he approved the purchase of only a 
few patents.  His opposition  appears to have been based on fear that  such a 
policy would jeopardize his control over innovations within the firm. Not only 
might the company no longer need him, but the policy of purchasing outside 
patents diluted the firm’s product line with worthless items. One questionable 
patent purchased by the company in 1889 was for “electric water.” When he 
learned that the company planned to test this substance, Thomson was enraged. 
He wrote the Boston office: “If our Company should go seriously to work to 
expand any money in making tests . . .  I should feel like resigning on the spot. 
I have plenty of material which I do not have the opportunity to work up.’’4* 
The purchase of outside patents and the amval of other inventors must have 
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suggested to Thomson that other members of the firm were implicitly challeng- 
ing his control over innovation. 
Thomson’s decision  not  to accommodate Coffin  may  also have been  in- 
formed  by  his  contractual  arrangements  with  the  company.  When  the 
Thomson-Houston Electric Company was formed in 1882, Thomson agreed to 
serve as the firm’s electrician in return for an annual salary of $5,000 and 15 
percent  of  any  new  stock  issued  by  the  company.  (Both  the  president  of 
Thomson-Houston, Henry A. Pevear, and Coffin received stock when the com- 
pany was formed, but the size of their holdings is unclear.) In 1887, Thomson 
signed a new agreement that extended his appointment  to July  1890. In this 
agreement,  Thomson gave up his share in any new  stock issue in return for 
$8,000. Up to that time, the firm had not increased its capital stock, and Thom- 
son may have concluded that he was better off taking the lump-sum payment. 
In May 1887,  however, the company did increase its capital stock to $500,000. 
One source suggests that Coffin deliberately tricked Thomson into giving up 
his stock option, but I have not found any documents in which Thomson com- 
plained about losing his stock option. Nevertheless, by December 1889, Thom- 
son may  have decided  that the early months of  1890 were the best time to 
put  pressure  on Coffin since it was then that  they  would  have renegotiated 
his 
Disappointed  with the production group, tired of the patent litigation, and 
worried  about this position as chief  innovator, Thomson was in no  mood to 
compromise his business-technological mind-set in the fall of 1889, especially 
as it related to the subject of safety. He had cooperated fully in the rapid intro- 
duction of the AC system and other products,  only to find that other groups 
did not respect his efforts and authority. In fact, he even perceived them  as 
undercutting his “power base” within the firm. And given that his contract was 
due to expire in July 1890, Thomson knew that it was time to force a change 
in his role with the company. 
3.4.3  An Organizational Denouement 
Even after his angry Christmas Eve letter, it took some time for Thomson- 
Houston managers to realize that Thomson expected to be treated differently. 
During the first months of  1890, he refused to evaluate any outside patents or 
to serve as an expert witness in court. Furthermore, Thomson expressed his 
anger by not corresponding with Coffin for nearly two months, even though 
previously they had exchanged letters and memos almost daily. Instead of com- 
ing in early and staying late at the Model Room, he spent more time at home 
and worked only half days. Using these tactics, Thomson communicated that 
he wanted his role within the firm to change. 
43. [Agreement between  ET and the T-H Electric Co.], 20 April  1887, TP, Collected Letters; 
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Sensing Thomson’s  unwillingness to handle certain kinds of  work, Coffin 
and Rice assigned routine product improvement to the engineering staff in 
the manufacturing group, and they established a legal department in 1891 to 
handle patent matters.” In the summer of 1890, Thomson replaced his contract 
with an informal agreement with Coffin by  which he was permitted to work 
on projects of his own choosing, as well as those needed by marketing or pro- 
duction. Under this agreement, Thomson continued to develop new products, 
but he also looked for opportunities to direct his work toward scientific and 
professional goals. Although he filed for patents for improved transformers and 
electric welding equipment, Thomson also conducted research and published 
articles  on  high-frequency  and  high-voltage  phenomena.  Professionally, 
Thomson began to take a more active part in the affairs of the American Insti- 
tute of  Electrical Engineers, and he was elected president of  that society in 
1889 and 1890. To express his concerns about the safety of electric lighting 
systems, he served on the National Electric Light Association’s subcommittee 
for overhead wiring, and he presented a paper, “Safety Devices in Electrical 
Installations,” at their annual meeting in 1890.45  In  redefining his position, 
Thomson knew that he was relinquishing some of his power over product inno- 
vation within the firm; other inventors and engineers were becoming responsi- 
ble for improving the company’s products. However, he must have sensed that 
only by shifting his interests could he overcome the dissatisfaction he had felt 
so sharply in the fall of  1889. 
Thomson’s anger over the AC-DC controversy signaled to Coffin and others 
that the innovation function was neither fully understood nor properly located 
within the firm. Only after pushing Thomson to the brink did the firm realize 
that innovation involved a variety of tasks-inventing,  patenting, giving expert 
testimony, and designing for manufacture-and  that these activities needed to 
be institutionalized in separate departments. Furthermore, by  buying outside 
patents and bringing in additional inventors, Coffin had wanted to expand the 
firm’s sources of innovation, but he did so at the cost of  upsetting the firm’s 
original innovator. As a result of that experience, Coffin was much more cir- 
cumspect about bringing in additional “star” inventors; for instance, Charles 
44. See ET to Robert P.  Clapp, 11 January  1890, TP, LB 4/89-1/90.  991-92;  ET to Capt. E. 
Griffin, 3 March  1890, TP, LB  1/90-11/90.  220-22;  and ET to Robert P.  Clapp, 29 April  1890, 
TP, LB 1/90-11/90,468. For the absence of letters from Thomson to CAC, see the first 175 pages 
of TP, LB 1/90-11/90.  For the new patent department, see “Testimony,” Intf.  15,s 11.99. 
45. For Thomson’s informal agreement with Coffin, see J. A. McManus, confidential memoran- 
dum, 12 September 1935, Hall of History Collection. For his new research projects, see Thomson 
1890a. 1891. Because of the demands placed on him by the company, Thomson was angry that he 
was not able to be more active as president of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers. As 
he complained to T. C. Martin, “this state of affairs is indeed very galling to me, and I hope to 
take steps to have the condition remedied sometime in the near future” (ET to T. C. Martin, 13 
January 1890, TP, LB 1/90-11/90,  3-4).  For Thomson’s efforts to promote safety, see ET to Capt. 
Eugene Griffin, 27 December 1889, TP, LB 4/89-1/90,902; ET to E. R. Weeks, 13 January 1890, 
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Steinmetz came to the Lynn factory in 1892 only after he had been carefully 
interviewed by Thomson and 
These organizational changes meant neither a triumphant victory for Coffin 
and the marketing group nor a resounding defeat for Thomson and product 
innovation. Rather, as often happens in organizations, these two groups and 
their leaders made just enough adjustments to ease the immediate tension. In- 
deed, these changes marked the start of  a decade of  gradual reshuffling of 
various activities related to product development and engineering. During the 
1890s,  as Thomson-Houston became General Electric, Coffin and Rice contin- 
ued to expand the engineering staffs at both the Lynn and Schenectady factor- 
ies, assigning different engineering teams to improve existing products and 
production processes. Under the leadership of Albert G. Davis, the patent and 
legal office grew in size and importance. At the same time, the company con- 
tinued to look to Thomson to develop new products. Because the depression 
of the mid-1890s curtailed the growth in the utility industry, GE asked Thom- 
son to develop new products that used its existing manufacturing capabilities. 
Thomson designed an X-ray system that could be manufactured using the lamp 
production facilities in Harrison, New Jersey, and he experimented with auto- 
mobiles, a product Coffin contemplated manufacturing at Lynn or Schenec- 
tady. However, in both cases, Thomson was frustrated that the equipment and 
manpower needed to build, test, and patent these new products was scattered 
across the company, making it very difficult to guide the development of these 
products. Consequently, in 1899, Thomson began calling for a central research 
and development facility in the company, and in 1900, GE responded by  creat- 
ing  the industrial research  laboratory at  the  Schenectady factory (Carlson 
1991, 301-39).  Although this laboratory brought together the resources and 
personnel needed for product innovation, its first leader, Willis R. Whitney, 
found himself in 1910s and 1920s bargaining and building coalitions for prod- 
ucts much as Thomson did during the 1880s (Wise 1979, 1985). 
3.5  Conclusion 
Applying the interest-group model to the Thomson-Houston Electric Com- 
pany reveals that it is possible to get inside the firm and trace how historical 
actors converted a small, entrepreneurial start-up to a large firm with a formal 
managerial structure. Significantly, this approach focuses our attention not 
only on how key activities were brought inside the firm but also on how these 
functions were coordinated by managers. 
As the Thomson-Houston case reveals, the managers of  this company re- 
sponded to the challenges of electric lighting by taking up the tasks of organiz- 
ing a national sales force, building a substantial factory, and undertaking con- 
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tinual  improvement  and expansion of  their product line. The triumvirate of 
Coffin, Thomson, and Rice perceived clearly the complexities of the market, 
organized these perceptions into an effective strategy and structure, and out- 
performed the rival Edison and Westinghouse companies. 
Although the rational-actor approach suggests that a firm will acquire a par- 
ticular structure to implement a particular strategy, form does not automatically 
follow function. Once functions are brought within the firm, there is no guaran- 
tee that the managers will know how to create a set of organizational arrange- 
ments that will permit employees to develop each function fully. Rather, man- 
agers such as Coffin had to make choices about which functions they could 
fully develop in the organization. Given finite resources and a rapidly growing 
market, Coffin chose to devote resources and personnel first to organizing mar- 
keting, not product innovation. Coffin understood marketing, and in a complex 
environment, businessmen  tend to do what they know  how to do best. Even 
though innovation was as important to the firm’s well-being as marketing, nei- 
ther Coffin nor Thomson fully understood all of the activities related to devel- 
oping new products, and so they organized this function on a trial-and-error 
basis. Although the firm did establish the Model Room for Thomson, the com- 
pany came to understand  all of  the tasks related to product innovation only 
after Thomson became overextended and angry in 1889.  Thus, although it may 
be obvious to us with our functionalist hindsight that the marketing strategy 
of central stations called for having the firm perform the function of product 
innovation, the historical record reveals that members of the firm did not auto- 
matically  or instinctively  create the organizational  structure needed to fully 
pursue innovation.  Instead, based on a variety  of  factors-the  personalities, 
skills, and perceptions of the actors-a  firm may integrate different functions 
or activities at different times and different ways. Indeed, that the managers at 
Edison and Westinghouse presumably had access to the same information and 
opportunities but created very different organizations underlines the contin- 
gent nature of how managers chose to institutionalize the key functions associ- 
ated with electric lighting. 
To make sense of the contingency associated with how functions are coordi- 
nated within the firm, we need a organizationaYpolitica1 perspective. Using an 
interest-group model, we can see how the  strong personalities in Thomson- 
Houston strove to create groups or departments to use their talents and imple- 
ment their business-technological mind-sets. Choosing at times to bargain and 
cooperate with each other and at other times to disagree, these interest groups 
determined how the key functions of design, manufacture, and marketing were 
coordinated in the process of introducing a new product such as AC lighting. 
Clearly, the coordination of the functions within the firm did not follow auto- 
matically from any strict logic but rather was the result of  the political  give- 
and-take of interest groups. 
It is important to note that while the give-and-take of groups within firms is 
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difficult to change. As entrepreneurs and inventors make the transition  from 
start-up firm to formal managerial hierarchy, they create patterns of social in- 
teraction  that can be difficult  to alter. Once the  members  of  the  Thomson- 
Houston  organization  became  accustomed  to  emphasizing  marketing  over 
product innovation, Thomson had to use rather dire tactics to alter his position 
in the company. Similarly, it took GE’s brush with bankruptcy during the Panic 
of  1893 before Coffin and the other former Thomson-Houston managers were 
able to rethink their marketing strategy and move into new areas such as the 
electrification of factories (Carlson 1991, 304-1 1). 
This observation of the conservative nature of organizational culture com- 
plements points made by Daniel Raff and Daniel Nelson in this volume. In his 
paper (chap. 1 in this volume), Raff suggests that the proliferation of compen- 
sation schemes in the U.S. auto industry in the 1920s must be explained in part 
by the tendency of firms to evolve their own internal practices in response to 
their own peculiar needs and customs. Likewise, Nelson (chap. 2 in this vol- 
ume) reveals that while industrial engineering is a significant cultural and intel- 
lectual development  in twentieth-century America, we should be cautious in 
assuming it significantly altered business practice. According to Nelson, man- 
agers  tended to employ  industrial engineering consultants  to fix  short-term 
problems and instead made decisions within the framework of existing corpo- 
rate practice. Taken together, these three papers suggest that the need to pay 
attention  to how the  structure and culture of  a firm influence its  ability to 
change and take up new innovations (see also Mokyr 1992). 
Using the interest-group model to study the development of the AC system 
also reminds us that there is no “one best way” to develop and use an innova- 
tion. Market forces may suggest some ways that a technology may develop, 
but only when groups within the firm perceive those market opportunities and 
link them to particular innovations. Moreover, within an organization, different 
groups will perceive markets and technologies differently, and a new product 
can only be brought to market when different groups negotiate and coordinate 
their efforts. As Langdon Winner (1986) has suggested, technological artifacts 
do have politics. Significantly, this political process-whereby  a technological 
development is linked to interests of different groups-is  not a “bad thing,” in 
the  sense  that  the  technology  is  compromised.  Indeed,  if  the  story  the 
Thomson-Houston AC system teaches us anything, it is that negotiation among 
groups is the only way  that firms can ensure that a product will possess  an 
effective set of attributes that will permit it to be manufactured and marketed. 
To  some extent, this is a lesson that American engineers and manufacturers 
have relearned, given the recent interest in development teams and concurrent 
engineering (Wheelwright and Clark 1992). 
In  highlighting  the  importance  of  how  individuals  and  groups  negotiate 
within  the  firm,  I  am  not  denying  the  rational  quality  of  the  outcome. 
Thomson-Houston did perform better in the marketplace, beating out Edison 
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of  strategy and structure. Rather, in taking an organizational approach, I want 
to suggest that what is interesting is the process by which Coffin, Thomson, 
and Rice created and maintained the winning combination. To study this pro- 
cess, we need to integrate the analytical tools of the economist and the histo- 
rian. From the economist, we need the perspective that presents the firm  as a 
set of production possibilities and helps us to analyze how firms with various 
production  possibilities interact in a market or industry Within the firm, an 
economics perspective is also essential in making sense of mind-set of individ- 
uals and groups;  how  do groups organize their perceptions  of  markets  and 
technology into a coherent  set of practices?  At the same time, we need the 
historian’s perspective to identify the social dynamics of groups inside and out- 
side the firm  and to address the subtle and contingent roles that personality, 
values, and culture play in shaping business decisions. Thus, it is only by com- 
bining economics and history that we will be able to understand  that central 
institution of capitalism, the business firm. 
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Comment  John Sutton 
In an excellent recent book on Elihu Thomson and General Electric, W.  Ber- 
nard Carlson developed a fresh and valuable perspective on a series of issues 
that have been much studied since the publication in 1953 of Harold Passer’s 
Electrical Manufacturers, 1875-1900.  In this admirable paper, he uses the his- 
tory of the Thomson-Houston company to develop a new theme, which relates 
to the way in which early entrepreneurial firms grow into elaborate managerial 
John Sutton is professor of economics at the London School of  Economics, where he directs 
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organizations. Central to this theme is the notion that we must move away from 
the idea of the firm as a single maximizing agent, toward the more complex 
representation of the firm as a set of  separate interest groups, with differing 
aims. These differing aims, the argument goes, may sometimes conflict, and 
may sometimes be reconciled. Only through an understanding of  these pro- 
cesses can we hope to arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the firm’s actions. 
In Carlson’s version of this approach, two ideas are emphasized: (i) progress 
occurs in the firm when the leaders of groups strive for cooperation rather than 
overtly challenge each other; (ii) the reason groups differ in their aims is that 
they differ in their “set of ideas and perceptions . . . of the market and of the 
potential  of  different  technological  options.”  Now  as a description  of  how 
things are, this  seems unobjectionable.  What matters is whether our under- 
standing of why things happened as they did is advanced by reference to this 
more complex model of the firm. Carlson argues that it is, and he does so by 
means of an appeal to two episodes in the firm’s history. 
The first episode relates to the success of Thomson-Houston in competing 
with Westinghouse  and the Edison organization in installing central stations 
during the late 1880s. Carlson attributes Thomson-Houston’s leading position 
to the fact that it successfully integrated its marketing,  manufacturing,  and 
innovation functions. That it succeeded in bringing these three groups into step 
is well established here, and I quite accept that this success was an important 
contributory factor in Thomson-Houston’s rise. On the other hand, I am not 
convinced that this is the whole story. 
The origins of Thomson-Houston’s strength in this period can be traced to 
the arc-lighting era of the early 188Os, when it competed successfully against 
the two firms then dominant, Brush and Weston. Of the 6,000 arc lights in use 
at the beginning of  1881, 5,000 were made by Brush and the remainder by 
Weston (Passer 1953, 56). By 1890, Thomson-Houston, and the companies it 
owned or controlled,  accounted  for two-thirds  of  the  235,000 arc lights in 
service. 
Thomson-Houston’s success in this period can be attributed to several factors 
(Passer 1953, 57); it is arguable that two of these were crucial. The first lay in 
Thomson-Houston’s strong focus on building up its position in the profitable 
“central-station” business; it was as a result of this that Thomson-Houston en- 
tered the next phase of competition-where  its main rivals were to be the Edi- 
son organization and Westinghouse-with  a head start. It had a strong position 
in supplying central stations, and usually placed clauses in its contract with the 
licensee company, requiring it to continue purchasing supplies from Thomson- 
Houston. The second factor distinguished Thomson-Houston from its less suc- 
cessful  rivals:  “After developing  a  workable  system, Brush  turned  to other 
fields of  interest and took out no arc-lighting patents after  1880. The Brush 
system of 1890 was essentially the one he had designed ten years before. Wes- 
ton also turned to other matters and did almost nothing in arc lighting after 
1880. But  Elihu  Thomson  continued  to improve and perfect his system all 96  W.  Bernard Carlson 
through the  1880s and the 1890s. He thus helped his company to secure and 
maintain its dominant position in arc-lighting equipment” (Passer 1953, 57). 
Other factors also played a part; Thomson-Houston  enjoyed  the financial 
backing of  a group of businessmen who were prepared to take the long view 
and to underwrite Thomson-Houston’s policy of acquisitions, which played an 
important role in the company’s growth. But whatever the view one takes of 
the relative importance of the several factors underlying Thomson-Houston’s 
early growth, it is clear  that the  company was well established  as a strong 
incumbent prior to the crucial period in the late 1880s when it had to face new 
competition from Edison and Westinghouse. 
The interpretation  of  the events that followed, as developed in the present 
paper, goes like this: Thomson-Houston succeeded in fusing the aims of three 
crucial groups within the company, which dealt with marketing, manufactur- 
ing, and innovation. The Edison  organization, by  contrast, was a loose and 
poorly coordinated set of companies; it developed a sales organization but suf- 
fered from weaknesses in product innovation and production. Westinghouse, 
in spite of  its strength  in innovation, was weak both  in marketing and in fi- 
nance,  where  its lack  of  strong links to banks  proved  crucial in  the  crisis 
of 1890. 
By the end of  the decade, price competition intensified,  while the pace of 
innovation demanded substantial investment. Increasing financial pressures, as 
Carlson has argued elsewhere (1991, 292-94),  led to two initiatives by outside 
financiers  to  consolidate  the  industry. They  first attempted  to  arrange  that 
Thomson-Houston  should take over the ailing Westinghouse. The failure of 
this initiative led them to encourage Coffin at Thomson-Houston, and Villard 
at Edison, to investigate a merger of their two companies. 
So what, then, are we to conclude from this first example? We can certainly 
agree that it is important and arguably even crucial to long-term success that 
an integration of aims between functions should be achieved. But Carlson ar- 
gues for more than this; his concern is to convince us that a proper understand- 
ing  of  how  the  industry  evolves  demands  that  we  come to grips  with  his 
“intrafirm groups” model, rather than treat each firm as a “single agent.” Rela- 
tive to this argument, his first example is suggestive rather than convincing; 
much depends on how much importance we attach to the factors that he em- 
phasizes in drawing up the strengths and weaknesses of the three main players 
on the eve of the financial reorganization of  1892, in which the future General 
Electric was born of  a fusion between Thomson-Houston and the Edison or- 
ganization. 
The second episode that Carlson chooses to advance his thesis is more con- 
vincing; it relates to the approach taken  by  Thomson-Houston  to the emer- 
gence of  alternating current, where Westinghouse  led the field. The issue is, 
why did Thomson-Houston  take  so long to make a serious commitment  to 
this field? On Passer’s interpretation, which  fits nicely  into a “single agent” 
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risk strategy by  being a “fast follower”; when, and only when, a first mover 
had  shown that a new  system could be established profitably  in the market 
would Thomson-Houston  then  follow. Given the company’s strength in  the 
market, it could afford to wait, knowing that it could in due course establish 
itself in the new regime. 
Carlson will have none of this: for him, the slowness of Thomson-Houston’s 
entry into the field did not reflect the rational calculation of a single agent. 
Rather, it was born of an impasse within the company between people whose 
vision of the technology and the marketplace were in sharp conflict. Carlson’s 
account of the differing priorities, preconceptions, and goals of Thomson and 
Coffin is telling.  His interpretation of  slow advance as the outcome of this 
stalemate is persuasive. 
But,  like Oliver, I would  like to ask for more. Will this kind  of example 
persuade economists to open up the black box that is their “firm,” and delve 
into its internal organization, the better to understand the evolution of market 
structure? Perhaps. But I have some niggling doubts. Not only do we have to 
rule out Passer’s “single agent” interpretation, but we are told by Carlson that 
the eventual outcome was, in some sense, a “good” one for Thomson-Houston. 
If I wanted to convince someone to adopt this more complex model of the firm, 
I would feel best armed if I had some examples in which the outcome was both 
difficult to reconcile with any reasonable “single agent” interpretation and was 
highly unsatisfactory to the firm in question. 
The kind of example 1  would appeal to is well illustrated by Foster’s discus- 
sion of DuPont’s actions in the U.S. tire market in the  late 1960s, when the 
dominant nylon-based tire was about to be overtaken by the technically supe- 
rior polyester tire (1986, 123ff.). 
DuPont was the market leader in nylon-based  tires; it was also the leading 
producer of  tire cord. It seemed ideally positioned to take over leadership in 
the new polyester-tire business. But it did not. Instead, the Celanese company, 
which had no interests in nylon, took a 75 percent share of the market with its 
polyester-based  tires. 
The reason for DuPont’s failure lay in its internal organization. Foster gives 
a fascinating account of  the internal maneuverings of  the nylon department, 
which had a big investment in the “old” technology, versus the innovators in 
the polyester  department, who wished  to champion the new.  All companies 
find it hard to accept that sunk costs are sunk, and the advent of a new technol- 
ogy means that we may have to write off investments  whose true economic 
value has suddenly collapsed. These difficulties can be reconciled if there is a 
strong center, or if-in  Carlson’s framework-all  groups are cooperating. In 
practice, there may be some game playing of the kind Foster describes at Du- 
Pont: First, the polyester champions develop a new product. The performance 
of the prototype is just below that of nylon, but is improving fast. This is met 
by a delaying tactic; the nylon department regards the case as unproven, and in 
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nylon tire plant is built. Now it becomes even harder to argue that sunk costs 
are sunk-and  by the time DuPont moves, Celanese has taken the lead. 
Before I close, I would like to turn to Carlson’s final remarks, in which he 
takes up a question that is central to the present volume: Why should econo- 
mists and historians talk to each other? Here I take a stronger line than Carlson. 
What is involved is not the usual sort of argument that we hear whenever “mul- 
tidisciplinary  studies” are mentioned: the point, for once, is sharp, specific, 
and should-for  the economists at least-be  compelling, for it derives directly 
from the central core of economic theory itself. 
A decade of work on game-theoretic models in industrial organization has 
made it plain that, in representing any market of interest, there will usually be 
many a priori reasonable  models, whose design differs in respect of features 
that we cannot observe, identify, or proxy empirically. As a result, many out- 
comes are “consistent with theory.” Now if all outcomes are possible, we are 
in the historian’s realm of accident and personality; and the business historian 
need pay little heed to what the economist has to say. But this is not, in fact, 
the case. Many outcomes are possible,  but by no means all. It turns out that 
there are certain competitive mechanisms whose operation across all reason- 
able candidate models constrains the set of possible outcomes. These “robust” 
mechanisms include, notably, the process of price competition and the process 
of competitive escalation of innovative efforts-whose  operation serves to de- 
limit the set of outcomes that can emerge (Sutton 1991). 
Carlson’s first example, which he elaborated  more fully in Carlson  1991, 
shows these two mechanisms leading to just the kind of breakdown of market 
structure that economic theory predicts (compare the story of  Carlson  1991, 
293ff. with that of Sutton 1991, chaps. 6 and 8, for example). What the econo- 
mist has to offer the historian here is the statement that some shift of structure 
involving exit, merger, or consolidation was probably inevitable by  1890-92. 
This observation suggests that we should not try to explain too much by claim- 
ing that this firm was strong, or that one weak. Something had to give. 
But many outcomes were possible: economic theory places only weak con- 
straints  on  the  data.  And  it  is  for  this  reason  that  the  economist  cannot 
do without  the  historian.  Only by  delving into the  details can we  hope  to 
understand  why  one  configuration  emerged  rather  than  another.  Coffin’s 
angry  retort  that he’d  prefer  to see Westinghouse  go bankrupt  rather  than 
merge  with  him  is hardly  the  kind  of  mechanism  on  which  we can build 
models-yet  it  probably  had  as  much  to  do with  the  emergence  of  the 
General Electric-Westinghouse  duopoly, as opposed to a THW-Edison  duop- 
oly, as did anything else in this fascinating story. 
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